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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Recent research has demonstrated that good judges - individuals who form accurate 
impressions of others - are skilled at detecting and utilizing social cues (Rogers & Biesanz, in 
press). Given this ability to detect and use cues, this study sought to determine whether good 
judges of personality are also skilled at detecting deception, as individuals are inaccurate in their 
judgements of deception (Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). A sample of college students (N = 262) 
viewed videos of 10 individuals answering getting to know you questions and rated their 
personality. They then viewed videos of 14 individuals either lying or telling the truth that they 
did not cheat on a math task. Results indicated that participants were accurate in rating the 
personality of others and their accuracy of judging lies was significantly higher than chance. 
However, personality accuracy was not related to accuracy of judging lies.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Social interactions are part of everyday life and are crucial for maintaining relationships 
and for meeting new people. During social interactions, especially during initial interactions, 
people attempt to understand others better. When people first meet someone, they form a first 
impression, which can influence how they view that individual in the future. This has 
implications for continuing relationships or applying for jobs. People use a variety of information 
to form first impressions, sometimes using unique information provided in their interactions with 
others and other times based on general impressions of people on average. Fortunately, people 
are generally accurate in judging others’ personalities (Biesanz, 2010; Biesanz & Human, 2010; 
Funder, 1995), but some people tend to view others more accurately- good judges (Funder, 1995; 
Letzring, 2008; Rogers & Biesanz, in press), and some people tend to be viewed more 
accurately- good targets (Human & Biesanz, 2011, 2013).  
Given that good judges of personality exist, it is possible that there is an underlying skill 
for forming interpersonal impressions. There are several forms of interpersonal impressions, 
including forming impressions of whether an individual is lying. If the skills of a good judge of 
personality translate to multiple forms of interpersonal impressions, it is possible that those skills 
could lead to accurate judgments of deception. Research on detecting deception has shown that 
the average person is generally inaccurate in their judgments of truth and lies (Bond & DePaulo, 
2008), with very few predicters being reliable, such as focusing on relevant cues of deception 
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(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010), being trained in relevant cues of deception (Ekman & 
O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et al., 2010), and the ability to identify micro-expressions (Frank & 
Ekman, 1997). This indicates that research needs to further assess what reliably predicts lying 
accuracy. In the current study I examined whether the good judge of personality would also be a 
good judge of lying.   
 
Interpersonal Perceptions 
Interpersonal perception involves a target- the individual whose personality is being 
judged- and a perceiver- the individual who is judging the personality of the target (Funder, 
1995). People are generally accurate in judging others’ personalities (Biesanz, 2010; Biesanz & 
Human, 2010; Funder, 1995). The Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) outlines the process for a 
perceiver to make an accurate judgment of a target (Funder, 1995). Both targets and perceivers 
are crucial to the process of forming accurate personality impressions. Targets must make 
relevant behaviors available to the perceiver (Funder, 1995). For example, for a target to be 
accurately viewed as extraverted they would need to exhibit relevant cues to extraversion, such 
as being talkative, frequently so that perceivers can detect those cues. Perceivers then have to 
detect and accurately utilize this information to form an accurate impression (Funder, 1995). For 
example, an accurate perceiver would detect, or observe, relevant cues to extraversion, such as 
being talkative, and then utilize those detected cues to rate that target high in extraversion instead 
of being high in neuroticism. RAM defines an accurate impression as one that agrees with the  
target’s personality traits (Funder, 1995). This agreement can be assessed in different ways, 
including comparing the perceiver’s impressions to the target’s self-reports of personality and 
reports of their personality from family or friends (Funder, 1995).  
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In line with Biesanz (2010) and Furr (2008), it is possible to assess two aspects of 
accuracy: distinctive and normative. Distinctive accuracy is when others see the unique 
personality traits in an individual and can distinguish them from other individuals (Biesanz, 
2010; Rogers, Wood, & Furr, 2018). This includes knowing levels of traits in individuals, such 
as whether an individual is more talkative than kind, and how they differ from other targets on 
those traits (Biesanz, 2010; Rogers et al., 2018). Normative accuracy is when perceivers view a 
target as similar to the average person, such as knowing how talkative and kind most people are 
(Biesanz, 2010; Rogers et al., 2018). Viewing individuals similarly to the average person’s 
personality, or normatively, also means the impressions is positive and socially desirable (e.g., 
most people are more kind than hostile), because the average person’s personality tends to be 
positive (Wood & Furr, 2016). Normative accuracy also tends to be a positive because the 
normative means are calculated by taking the average of all the targets’ self-report, and most 
people tend to self-report in a positive manner (Borkenau & Leising, 2016; Wood, Gosling, & 
Potter, 2007).  
It is necessary to separate these two aspects of impressions because impressions could 
relate strongly with a target’s self-report, but once the normative profile is accounted for their 
impressions may not relate strongly with a target’s self-report (Furr, 2008; Rogers et al., 2018). 
This would indicate that they were not viewing the target’s unique personality traits but are 
seeing them as similar to the average person. A perceiver’s impressions could also not relate with 
a target’s self-report, but once the normative profile is accounted for their impressions may relate 
strongly with a target’s unique self-report (Furr, 2008; Rogers et al., 2018). This would indicate 
that the perceiver was viewing the target in line with their unique traits. When only assessing the 
raw personality profile, it is possible that researchers could draw incorrect conclusions because 
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most personality profiles tend to be normative (Furr, 2008). By separating personality profiles 
into distinctive and normative assessments it provides researchers with more information about 
the ways in which perceivers are viewing the targets.  
 
Variability in Interpersonal Perception 
While, on average, people are accurate in their impressions of others, there are individual 
differences in the tendency to view others accurately and to be viewed accurately by others. 
Moreover, a specific dyad may also result in a more or less accurate impression than expected by 
either the target or perceiver average tendencies. While it is important to find that people can 
view others accurately and be viewed accurately, it is also important to understand how people 
vary these abilities to judge and be judged accurately.  
Recent research has focused on individual differences in being a good target – an 
individual who tends to be understood easily and accurately by others (Human & Biesanz, 2011, 
2013; Human, Biesanz, Finseth, Pierce, & Le, 2014; Human, Biesanz, Parisotto, & Dunn, 2012). 
In line with RAM (Funder, 1995), targets primarily influence impression accuracy via cue 
relevancy and availability, but targets may also be able to obtain greater attention from a 
perceiver, thereby increasing detection (Human et al., 2012). Indeed, well-adjusted targets are 
seen more accurately because they disclose a higher quality of personality information (Human 
& Biesanz, 2011) and tend to behave more in line with their personality (Human et al., 2014). 
Moreover, targets who self-present are viewed more accurately by others because they were 
engaging and well liked, resulting in perceivers paying closer attention during interactions 
(Human et al., 2012).  
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Compared to targets, perceivers do not vary widely in how accurately they judge the 
personality of others. Females are more normatively accurate than males and have greater 
knowledge of the average personality (Chan, Rogers, Parisotto, & Biesanz, 2011; Rogers & 
Biesanz, 2015). Research has also indicated that the motivation of the perceiver impacts 
accuracy. When perceivers are motivated to judge a target accurately, by being told to be as 
accurate as possible, they perceive more detailed information about the target’s personality and 
form more distinctive, but less normative impressions (Biesanz & Human, 2010). Finally, 
individuals that are good judges are better able to judge personality as they have general 
knowledge about personality and human nature, are highly intelligent, have social skills, and 
greater similarity to the target (Davis & Kraus, 1997). However, different studies have found 
various characteristics associated with being a good judge. Overall, perceivers are more accurate 
when they observe unique and detailed information about targets and are able to apply those 
observations in order to form accurate personality impressions. 
 
The Distinctive Good Judge 
While people are generally accurate in judging personality, the good judge forms more 
accurate impressions of others (Funder, 1995; Letzring, 2008; Rogers & Biesanz, in press). 
There have been contradictory results regarding the existence of the good judge. Some research 
indicates that there is no evidence of good judges (Allik, de Vries, & Realo, 2016) or that they 
are not significantly different from average judges of personality (Haselton & Funder, 2006). 
However, there are methodological issues that prevent the effect of the good judge from being 
evident in some studies. One is that when searching for the good judge, impressions are formed 
across good and poor targets. Poor targets do not provide enough cues to their personality 
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(Human & Biesanz, 2013), meaning that they provide little to no information about their 
personality traits. Without information on a target’s personality, even those skilled in accurately 
judging personality cannot form accurate impressions (Rogers & Biesanz, in press). As a result, 
it appears that the good judge is no more accurate in forming impressions than the average 
person because the individual differences in the good judge are washed out. Conversely, when 
studies assess the effects of good targets it makes it possible for the individual differences of the 
perceiver to be evident, showing that good judges of personality form more accurate impressions 
than a poor judge of personality (Rogers & Biesanz, in press). With more support for the 
existence of the good judge, it is important to understand what characteristics result in the ability 
of the good judge to form accurate impressions.  
Research has documented several potential characteristics of good judges, such as a 
greater understanding of human nature, social skills, higher intelligence, and greater similarity to 
the target (Davis & Kraus, 1997). These positive characteristics have been found in recent 
research to make others feel comfortable providing information about themselves (Letzring, 
2008), thereby aiding the process of accurate personality judgments. The characteristics of the 
good judge also relate to the process of accurate personality judgments proposed by Funder 
(1995) in the RAM model of accuracy. First, it is possible that due to the good judge’s social and 
agreeable nature, targets may provide more relevant cues in the interaction because they are 
comfortable around the good judge (Letzring, 2008). This makes them better able to obtain 
information about targets which improves accuracy. They also detect more of the cues provided 
by the target by being attentive and possibly more motivated to accurately judge personality and  
then better utilize those cues to form accurate impressions of personality (Rogers & Biesanz, in 
press). Research on the ability of the good judge to accurately judge personality raises the 
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question of what other skills the good judge may have. Given that they have higher impression 
accuracy, would they also have higher lie detection accuracy?  
 
Detecting Deception 
Research on detecting deception has found that, on average, individuals are often 
inaccurate in their judgments of lying, with lie detection accuracy being no better than chance 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997). 
However, some characteristics of targets and perceivers increase the accuracy of detecting 
deception, such as individuals who are high in openness and agreeableness (Enos et al., 2006). 
Those high in openness may adjust to other viewpoints and rely less on set preconceptions about 
relevant deception cues (Enos et al., 2006). Additionally, increased lie detection accuracy is also 
the result of focusing on relevant cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010). The 
ability to focus on relevant cues can be improved with training (Vrij et al., 2010), which is 
supported by research showing that secret service agents accurately detect lies at slightly higher 
than chance levels (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991). This could indicate that skill is involved in 
detecting lies. Training methods include telling people the cues to focus on and ones to ignore, 
educating people on what cues are relevant to lie detection, or providing feedback on whether 
their judgments of lies were accurate (Vrij et al., 2010). However, some individuals who are 
trained in detecting deception are still only accurate at chance levels, indicating that training is 
not the only component of accurately judging deception.  
Moreover, the type of lie may relate to an individual’s ability to detect lies. Frank and 
Ekman (1997) found that lie detection accuracy in two different high stakes situations, one in 
people were lying about a crime and one in which they were lying about their opinion, were 
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related. This means that high stakes lies were accurately judged across two different studies, 
showing a reliable ability to judge high stakes lies. Frank and Ekman (1997) also found that lie 
accuracy was also related to the ability to identify micro-expressions, which are brief facial 
expressions demonstrating strong emotions. This demonstrates that micro-expressions may be a 
reliable indicator that someone is lying. However, low stakes lies are often not accurately judged 
across different types of lies (Frank & Ekman, 1997). In sum, type of lie is associated with 
accuracy, such that high stakes lies are often easier to detect than low stakes lies.  
Additionally, similar to impression accuracy (Human & Biesanz, 2013), targets vary 
more in their ability to lie than perceivers do in their ability to detect lies (Bond & DePaulo, 
2008). This indicates that the processes involved in judging personality and deception have 
similarities, which could mean that the process of accurately forming impressions of personality 
and deception could be related. There also appear to be methodological parallels in personality 
and deception research that could contribute to lower accuracy. Lie detection research often does 
not directly assess whether people are judging good or bad liars (Culhane, Kehn, Hatz, & 
Hildebrand, 2015; DesJardins & Hodges, 2015; Frank & Ekman, 1997), just as first impression 
research often assesses the ability to form accurate impressions across good and bad targets. This 
could be another reason why lying accuracy has been low in previous research. While a recent 
meta-analyses found that accuracy of judging personality and deception were unrelated, this 
study still has the same methodological issues of assessing accuracy of perceivers across good 
and bad targets (Schlegel, Boone, & Hall, 2017). Some of the interpersonal assessments also had 
low reliability and construct validity, as the personality assessments did not correlate strongly 
with one another. This indicates that the personality assessments analyzed were not valid or 
measured personality accuracy too differently for these measures to correlate. If the personality 
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assessments did not correlate strongly with one another it would be unlikely for them to correlate 
strongly with an assessment of lying accuracy. Thus, it remains an open question whether an 
individual who generally understands the personality of others is also able to detect lies. 
 
Reasons for Inaccurate Judgments of Deception 
 The impressions that an individual forms of others impacts their ability to accurately 
judge lying. If perceivers viewed a target as credible and trustworthy, they were more likely to 
think the target was being honest even if the target was lying (Baker, Porter, ten Brinke, & 
Mundy, 2016; Bond & DePaulo, 2008). Self-presentation could also influence accuracy of 
detecting deception. Individuals that are lying could portray themselves more positively than is 
accurate, which elicits positive impressions from perceivers in first impression research (Human 
et al., 2012). This could influence perceivers to indicate that someone is telling the truth even if 
they are lying. However, in first impression research positive self-presentation can also lead to 
greater distinctive accuracy in personality impressions as the engaging nature of the target is 
associated with increased attention from the perceiver (Human et al., 2012). This could indicate 
that positive self-presentation could make perceivers more attentive to the targets and increase 
their accuracy of detecting lies. While the direction of this influence in deception research is 
unclear, these findings do indicate that how individuals view others and how individuals present 
themselves could influence lie detection accuracy.   
Overall, perceivers assume that targets are honest, which is referred to as truth bias (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2008). One study found that truth biases were prevalent in face-to-face interactions, 
especially when individuals knew one another (Burgoon & Buller, 1994). Another study found 
that discovered that perceivers also assumed target honesty due to lack of motivation to 
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accurately detect lies, as it is simpler and sometimes beneficial to accept lies (Vrij et al., 2010). 
While most perceivers assume honesty, there are some perceivers that consistently assume 
targets are lying, referred to as lie biases. Lie biases were present when perceivers were 
suspicious in nature (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Burgoon & Buller, 1994). These biases often 
overwhelm the average individual’s ability to detect lies.  
Lie detection is a challenging task. Verbal and nonverbal cues are crucial in detecting 
deception, and research has indicated that participants often attributed deception to irrelevant 
cues (DePaulo et al., 1997). Cues are often difficult to detect as targets attempt to appear credible 
and hide deceptive cues, especially with high stakes lies, and there are also small differences 
between cues that indicate individuals were telling the truth and cues that indicate individuals 
were lying (Vrij et al., 2010). As a result, perceivers struggle to accurately utilize cues as there 
are no specific and unique cues associated only with lying (Vrij et al., 2010). For example, 
perceivers often think that targets will look away and move more frequently when they are lying, 
when the opposite is true (Vrij et al., 2010; Vrij & Semin, 1996). Lie detection accuracy also 
decreases when perceivers focus too much on nonverbal cues without considering relevant verbal 
cues (Vrij et al., 2010). When perceivers relied on irrelevant cues and were confident in their 
judgments of lying and in their own skill of detecting deception, lie detection accuracy decreased 
(DePaulo et al., 1997; Vrij et al., 2010). Thus, it is important to focus on relevant cues to 
deception in order to accurately detect deception.  
 
Relevant Cues to Deception 
Perceivers often attribute deception to inaccurate cues, demonstrating the importance of 
knowing accurate deception cues, which consist of both verbal and nonverbal cues. However, 
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both verbal and nonverbal cues are often idiosyncratic. Verbal cues to deception can include 
speech, such as errors in speech, fillers such as “um” or “ah”, long pauses before responding, 
talking slower, and tone and pitch of voice (DePaulo et al., 2003; Levitan et al., 2015; Vrij et al., 
2010; Vrij & Semin, 1996). DePaulo et al. (2003) found that the content of speech is also 
important, with truthful stories containing more detail and sensory information than lies in some 
cases (DePaulo et al., 2003). Those that are lying may also be more negative in their comments, 
complaining often (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, these cues vary between targets and are not 
always reliable indicators of whether an individual is lying.  
Nonverbal cues to deception can include less body movement and emotional cues present 
in facial expression (DePaulo et al., 2003; Frank & Ekman, 1997; Vrij & Semin, 1996). 
Emotional cues are often present in high stakes lies, where emotions are expressed on the target’s 
face as micro-expressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997; Yan, Wang, Liu, Wu, & Fu, 2014). Micro-
expressions only briefly show emotion, so training is often necessary to be able to detect these 
expressions (Yan et al., 2014). These facial expressions may be less pleasant than someone 
telling the truth (DePaulo et al., 2003). Research has demonstrated the importance of both verbal 
and nonverbal cues in lie detection accuracy as well as the importance of considering both when 
determining whether a target is lying (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et al., 2010). There are 
few reliable cues to deception, which contributes to the difficulty of the task of detecting 
deception. 
With research suggesting that individuals, on average, cannot accurately detect deception 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo et al., 1997) it leaves open for the possibility of important 
individual differences. That is, while on average, people may be no better than chance, there may 
still be important variability across individuals. As such, it is possible that the good judge of 
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personality may be one person who is also able to better detect lying. The ability of a good judge 
to detect and utilize relevant cues should help them overcome the reasons for inaccurate 
judgments of deception. Their skills in forming impressions of personality could translate to the 
task of detecting deception, which would make a good judge of personality more accurate in 
detecting lies.   
 
Other Types of Accuracy  
As lie detection involves forming impressions of the value of honesty, it is important to 
know whether individuals can accurately judge values. In addition to the judgments of 
personality traits, research has examined the accuracy of judging values - the motivation and 
reasoning behind an individual’s decision to behave in a certain way (McDonald & Letzring, 
2016). Research indicates that perceivers more accurately judged traits than values (McDonald & 
Letzring, 2016). While some values, such as tradition, were judged accurately, overall 
perceivers’ ratings of traits were more accurate (McDonald & Letzring, 2016). However, when 
separating normative and distinctive accuracy, there was no significant difference in accuracy of 
personality and value judgments (McDonald & Letzring, 2016). This could indicate that the 
ability to judge personality is related to judging values like honesty when assessing the two  
components of accuracy. As good judges are more distinctively accurate, a good judge of 
personality could also be a good judge of values, such as honesty, and therefore more accurate in 
detecting deception. 
As demonstrated in studies with high stakes lies, emotional cues are important in lie 
detection accuracy. Empathy of the perceiver is crucial to accurately judging affect, however this 
is only the case if the target clearly expresses their emotions (Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008), 
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just as having a good target influences accuracy of personality impressions. Research indicates 
that individuals are equally accurate in judging affect and personality (Hall, Gunnery, Letzring, 
Carney, & Colvin, 2016). There was a relationship between judging personality and affect when 
the affect and personality trait were related; for example, accurately judging negative affect was 
related to accurately judging neuroticism (Hall et al., 2016). This indicates that similar processes 
are used to judge affect and personality. Therefore, a good judge of personality may be a good 
judge of affect. This could mean that good judges may be better able to detect the emotional cues 
present when targets lie which should increase accuracy.  
 
The Good Judge’s Ability to Detect Deception 
The characteristics of good judges may increase their lie detection accuracy by helping 
them avoid hindrances to lie detection accuracy and increasing their ability to detect relevant 
deception cues. Research has indicated that individuals do not accurately detect deception (Bond 
& DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo et al., 1997) as a result of inaccurate personality judgments (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008), biases (Bond & DePaulo, 2008; Burgoon & Buller, 1994), difficulties present in  
detecting lies (Vrij et al., 2010), and focusing on irrelevant cues (DePaulo et al., 1997; Vrij et al., 
2010; Vrij & Semin, 1996).  The ability of a good judge to detect and utilize relevant cues should 
help them overcome the reasons for inaccurate judgments of deception.  
The truth bias present in deception research (Bond & DePaulo, 2008) could be the result 
of normative accuracy. Perceivers may not have received enough information to distinguish the 
targets from the average person. Since the average personality profile is positive (Biesanz, 2010; 
Rogers & Biesanz, 2015; Wood et al., 2007), lie detection accuracy could decrease by viewing a 
lying individual as an average person. Given that good judges are distinctively accurate, their 
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ability to detect more cues and unique information about the target could decrease the biases 
present in deception research due to inaccurate personality judgments, thereby increasing 
accuracy (Funder, 1995; Letzring, 2008). 
The good judge’s ability to detect and utilize cues (Rogers & Biesanz, in press) may help 
them overcome the difficulties of unclear cues due to attempts to appear credible, minor 
differences in behavior of those telling the truth and lying, and the lack of a single defining cue  
of deception. They should be able to detect relevant cues of deception more often than the 
average person and utilize those cues more appropriately instead of focusing on and drawing 
conclusions from irrelevant cues.  
Research has also shown that personality traits (Enos et al., 2006), occupation (Ekman & 
O'Sullivan, 1991), training and skill (Vrij et al., 2010), and focusing on relevant deception cues 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010) can improve lie detection accuracy. Research on the 
influence of occupation and training on lie detection accuracy indicate that skill is involved in  
detecting lies. With the good judge’s skill in impression accuracy, it is possible that skill will 
improve the lie detection accuracy. Finally, good judges are better able to detect and utilize cues, 
so they should focus on relevant verbal and nonverbal cues and utilize both forms of cues.  
 
Hypotheses 
 Given that good judges can accurately judge personality, it is possible they have other 
abilities such as lie detection. Are good judges more accurate in their judgments of everyday lies 
and high stakes lies? I hypothesized that good judges would more accurately detect high stakes 
and everyday lies than a poor judge. I also predicted that there would be a stronger effect for 
high stakes lies as these provide more cues, such as micro-expressions. Normative judges, those 
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who tend to rate someone as similar to the average person, I predicted would display an honesty 
bias because of their positive impressions. Given that confidence in irrelevant deception cues 
decreases lie detection accuracy, I predicted that good judges, who focus on relevant cues, who 
are confident in their ratings of personality and lie detection would have higher levels of lie 
detection accuracy. Alternatively, poor judges, who focus on irrelevant cues, who are confident 
in their ratings would have lower levels of lie detection accuracy. Good judges of honesty and 
agreeableness would also differ in lie detection accuracy due to their ability to understand how 
honest and agreeable people are on average. If perceivers can accurately judge a target’s general 
tendency to be honest, they would be able to judge whether an individual is lying in a given 
scenario. Similarly, if perceivers can accurately judge a target’s general tendency to be sincere 
and non-manipulative, characteristic of those high in agreeableness, they would be able to judge 
whether an individual is being sincere and honest in their statements.  
Personality traits of the perceivers would also predict lying accuracy. Specifically, those 
high in openness and agreeableness would be more accurate in judging lies. Those that value 
honesty would also more accurately detect lies. Finally, I predicted an interaction between 
perceived credibility or trustworthiness of target and the accuracy of lie detection. If targets are 
honest and are perceived to be trustworthy then lie detection accuracy would increase. However, 
if the target is not honest but is perceived to trustworthy then lie detection accuracy would 
decrease.  
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CHAPTER II 
PILOT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Overview 
The purpose of the pilot study was to determine which interview videos to use as stimuli 
for participants to rate the personality of targets in the thesis study. Participants viewed 10 or 11 
different individuals answering the same basic getting to know you questions before rating the 
personality of those individuals. After each video, they rated the personality of the target. This 
study, called Analyzing Personality, was approved by the University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooga’s (UTC) Institutional Review Board with the approval code of 16-057 and lasted 
for one hour. 
 
Participants 
A total of 310 (271 female) UTC students between the ages of 18 and 62 years (M = 
20.95, SD = 4.96) participated in the study. They were recruited through the psychology 
department’s human subject pool (n = 133), the SONA system, in which they participated in 
groups of 1 to 9 (Mdn = 5), as well as through research methods and statistics laboratory courses 
(n = 177) in which they participated in groups of 9 to 27 (Mdn = 13). Two participants were 
excluded due to tablet malfunctions during the study and specific impressions were excluded if 
participants knew a specific target (n = 86, 3% of impressions). This ensures that all judgments  
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are coming from first impressions of the targets’ personality.  As a result, perceivers formed 6 to 
11 impressions after excluding data (Mdn = 8). Finally, 6 perceivers only rated 8 out of the 10 
videos due to a fire alarm. Participants received course extra credit for participating. 
 
Materials 
The videos used in this study were created in a previous research project at UTC in which 
one of two researchers interviewed participants with basic getting to know you questions. A total 
of 92 targets were taped answering questions regarding major life decisions (Andersen & Ross, 
1984; Human et al., 2014), passions (Human et al., 2014), greatest accomplishments, and other 
questions that were not of interest to this study. To create the sets of videos for this study, target 
videos were excluded if the target did not consent to showing the video (n = 2), did not receive 
any peer or parent reports (n = 34), or the peer and parent reports did not vary in their responses 
(n = 2), if the target did not complete the self-report of their personality (n = 1), or the target did 
not respond to all of the chosen interview questions (n = 2). Self, peer and parent reports of the 
target’s personality are necessary for my analytical method to create a composite of personality 
traits for each target using the average of these personality reports, so the video targets 
nominated peers and a parent or guardian to report on the target’s personality. The perceivers’ 
judgments were then compared to these composites to determine which targets were more 
accurately judged by others. These exclusion criteria left 51 (48 female) videos that were divided 
into 5 video sets of 10 to 11 people that were counterbalanced to offset order effects and fatigue, 
resulting in a total of 10 video sets. Ages were between 18 and 49 (M = 22.3, SD = 6.10) and the 
video lengths were between 1 min and 2 s and 7 min and 55 s (M = 2 min 24 s, SD = 0.05).  
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Personality Measure 
 The video targets completed the 40 item mini marker scale (Saucier, 1994) which 
assesses the big five personality traits of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
emotional stability, and openness (see Appendix A). Responses were on a scale of 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). All ratings of personality (informants, impressions) completed 
this scale to rate the personality of the video targets.  
 
Procedure  
For those that participated through the SONA system, 1 of the 10 video sets were 
randomly chosen for each session before the study and the questionnaires were opened on tablets 
using Qualtrics. Participants first reviewed the consent form and after consenting they provided 
their age and gender. Participants then viewed the randomly chosen video set of 10 or 11 
different individuals answering basic getting to know you questions. After each interview the 
video was paused for participants to complete the mini marker scale (Saucier, 1994) to rate the 
personality of that individual. After all the videos had been viewed and participants finished 
rating the personality of all the individuals in the video, participants were debriefed, and the 
study ended. The same procedure was followed for those that participated in research methods 
and statistics laboratory courses, except the Qualtrics survey was emailed to all the students in 
the course and they opened the questionnaires on the laboratory computers.  
 
Data Analytic Procedure 
I used the social accuracy model (SAM) to analyze how accurately the targets were 
viewed (Biesanz, 2010). I first calculated the mean by item of male and female participants’ 
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responses to the self-report personality measure, creating the normative profile. Then I created 
the distinctive accuracy component by averaging the target’s personality self-report with their 
informant reports for each item (Biesanz, 2010) and subtracted the normative means from the 
self and informant means for each item. I obtained this information from the personality self-
reports and peer and parent reports from the forming impressions study conducted at UTC. The 
target validity measure and average self-reported personality were used simultaneously as 
predictors of the perceiver’s impression (Biesanz, 2010).  
I analyzed Equation 1 to estimate overall normative and distinctive accuracy: 
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑘  =  β0𝑖𝑗  + β1𝑖𝑗 𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑘  +  β2𝑖𝑗 𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑘  + ε𝑖𝑗𝑘, 
where Ratingijk is perceiver i’s rating of target j on item k, 𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑗𝑘  is target j’s averaged self- 
and informant- report on item k, and 𝑇𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅k is the average response for the sample on item k. 
The slopes in Equation 1 were estimated for each dyad: 
β1ij assesses the distinctive accuracy of perceiver i for target j. This estimates how 
accurately targets were viewed in line with their unique traits, distinguishing them from 
the average person. Distinctive accuracy assesses the extent that perceivers accurately 
judged the unique traits of the targets.  
 
 
β2ij assesses the normative accuracy of perceiver i’s rating of target j. This estimates the 
extent to which perceivers viewed the targets as similar to the average person. Normative 
accuracy assesses the extent that perceivers judge the targets as similar to the average 
person and views them positively.  
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These estimates were further broken down into main effects for perceivers, targets, and dyads, as 
demonstrated in Equation 2:  
β0𝑖𝑗 =  β00 + u0𝑖 + 𝑢0𝑗 +  𝑢0(𝑖𝑗), 
β1𝑖𝑗 =  β10 + u1𝑖 +  𝑢1𝑗 +  𝑢1(𝑖𝑗), and 
β2𝑖𝑗 =  β20 + u2𝑖 + 𝑢2𝑗 +  𝑢2(𝑖𝑗), 
where β0ij estimates the intercept for perceiver i for target j, β1ij estimates the distinctive accuracy 
of perceiver i for target j, and β2ij estimates the normative accuracy of perceiver i for target j. 
These estimates indicate how distinctively and normatively accurate perceivers were in judging 
the targets and how distinctively and normatively accurate targets were viewed. The purpose of 
this study was to find targets that were viewed more distinctively accurately than others, 
indicating that they are a good target that provides relevant cues to their personality. As a result, 
I focused on the target random effects for distinctive accuracy.  
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CHAPTER III 
PILOT STUDY RESULTS 
 
 
Overall Impression Accuracy 
 First, I assessed the general accuracy of the perceivers’ personality impressions of the 
video targets. Overall, perceivers were distinctively accurate, meaning their impressions of the 
target were related to the targets’ self-report of personality (Table 1). Perceivers were also 
normatively accurate, meaning that perceivers viewed the targets as similar to the average person 
and positively (Table 1). I also assessed the individual differences in how distinctively and 
normatively accurately the targets were viewed, allowing me to determine whether the targets 
varied in how accurately they were viewed. Targets did vary significantly in how distinctively 
and normatively accurately they were viewed, indicating that some targets were viewed more 
accurately than others (Table 1). This provided evidence for good targets; those individuals were 
the ones I chose for my thesis stimuli. I also created a density plot to provide a visual 
representation of the variability of the normative and distinctive accuracy assessments. The 
density plot for target distinctive accuracy shows the variability between targets in their ability to 
be judged distinctively accurate (Figure 1). The density plot for target normative accuracy shows 
the variability between targets in their ability to be judged normatively accurate (Figure 2). 
These density plots highlight the variability in how accurately the targets were viewed.  
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Table 1  Pilot Study Personality Impression Accuracy 
 
Parameter Estimates (SE) 
Fixed Effects  
Intercept 3.84 (0.02)*** 
Distinctive Accuracy 0.12 (0.02)*** 
Normative Accuracy 0.75 (0.04)*** 
Random Effects  
Perceiver  
    Intercept 0.29*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.05*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.35*** 
Target  
    Intercept 0.11*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.14*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.25*** 
Residual SD 1.32 
Sample Sizes  
Perceivers 287 
Targets 51 
Note. ***p < .001  
 
 
 
Figure 1  Density plot for target distinctive accuracy  
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Figure 2  Density plot for target normative accuracy 
 
Chosen Video Stimuli 
 To choose the video stimuli for my thesis study, I narrowed the videos down to the 10 
targets that obtained the highest estimates for the distinctive accuracy assessment. One of those 
videos lasted for 7 min 55 s, which was much higher than the other video lengths that were 
between 1 min and 8 s and 2 min and 57 s (M = 2 min 11 s, SD = 3.22 s). I chose to exclude that 
target because they were an outlier, possibly providing more cues than the other targets or 
causing participants to lose focus while viewing the video. Instead, I chose the target that was 
rated the 11th most distinctively accurate. The accuracy estimates were between 0.14 and 0.40 (M 
= 0.26, SD = 0.11). Figure 3 plots the normative and distinctive accuracy of all video targets. The 
targets that were chosen for the main study are indicated by the markers that are filled in. 
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Figure 3  Scatterplot of normative vs. distinctive target assessments 
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CHAPTER IV 
THESIS STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Overview 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether those who understand the personality 
of others are also able to determine whether an individual is lying. Participants completed self-
reports of personality, valuing honesty, and demographics. Participants then viewed videos of 
targets answering basic getting to know you questions and rated the targets’ personality. They 
then viewed videos of targets telling low and high stakes true or false statements and determined 
which statements were true and which were lies. This study, called Accuracy of Impressions, 
was approved by the UTC Institutional Review Board with the approval code of 17-181 and 
lasted for two hours. 
 
Participants 
 A total of 262 (218 female) UTC students participated in the study, ages were between 18 
and 63 (M = 21.89, SD = 5.23). They were recruited using the SONA system (n = 74) as well as 
various undergraduate courses (n = 188). For those that participated through the SONA system, 
students participated in groups of 1 to 7 (Mdn = 4). For those that participated in undergraduate 
courses, students participated in groups of 30 to 97 (Mdn = 61). Specific impressions were 
excluded if the perceiver did not vary their responses (n = 9, 0.4%) or if they knew the target (n 
= 234, 10%). This ensures that all judgments are coming from first impressions of the target’s 
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personality. As a result, perceivers formed 1 to 10 personality impressions after excluding data 
(Mdn = 6). Participants received course extra credit and were entered in a drawing for 1 of 10 25-
dollar gift cards for participating. 
 
Materials 
Personality Videos 
I created the personality videos by choosing the 10 targets (9 female) that were rated the 
most distinctively accurate from the pilot study. Ages were between 18 and 22 (M = 19.8, SD = 
1.62) and the video lengths were between 1 min and 8 s and 2 min and 57 s (M = 2 min 13 s, SD 
= 1.48 s). The order of these videos was counterbalanced to ensure effects were not due to the 
order of the videos or fatigue.  
 
Lying Videos 
The 14 lie videos (14 male) were obtained from Hatz (2007) and Culhane et al. (2015). In 
this study participants were instructed to work through math problems that would be used to 
place incoming freshman. They were told to work with the other participant, a confederate, to 
complete some of the problems and to work on the others alone. With half of the participants the 
confederate asked for help on the problems they were supposed to complete alone and with the 
other half they did not ask for help. Those that the confederate asked for help did help and those 
that the confederate did not ask worked alone. The experimenter then graded the problems and 
told all participants that it appeared they had cheated, and they would be punished if they had 
cheated. Those in the low stakes condition (n = 6) were told they would not receive extra credit if 
they had cheated and those in the high stakes condition (n = 8) were told they would appear 
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before an honor board if they had cheated. Participants were questioned and videotaped and 
those that did cheat lied in their responses (n = 6) and those that did not cheat were honest in 
their responses (n = 8). This created high stakes lies (n = 4) and honest videos (n = 4), as well as 
low stakes lies (n = 2) and low stakes honesty videos (n = 4). Ages ranged from 18 to 22 and the 
video lengths ranged from 30 s to 2 min 53 s (M= 59 s, SD = 1.50 s). These videos were 
compiled by randomly ordering the low and high stakes lies to create one video sequence and 
was counterbalanced to create another video sequence to ensure effects were not due to video 
order or fatigue.   
 
Measures 
Personality 
Participants completed the mini marker scale (Saucier, 1994) to report their own 
personality, which assesses the big five personality traits of extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness. It contains 40 items with eight items for 
each personality trait and responses are on a scale of 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 (agree strongly). 
For this study, an additional eight items were included to assess honesty-humility (see Appendix 
A). Descriptive statistics for this measure are reported in Table 2. This scale was also used to rate 
the personality of the video targets, with an additional item to indicate whether they knew the  
video target (see Appendix B). This was used as an exclusion criterion to only assess first 
impressions of personality. Participants also completed a basic demographics questionnaire (see 
Appendix C).  
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Table 2  Descriptive Statistics of Self-Report Measures  
 
Self-Report Measure Mean SD Reliability (α) 
Saucier’s Mini-Markers   0.80 
Extraversion 4.52 1.10 0.83 
Agreeableness 5.74 0.78 0.82 
Openness 5.41 0.86 0.80 
Conscientiousness 5.42 0.90 0.83 
Emotional Stability 4.38 0.97 0.77 
Honesty-Humility 5.63 0.68 0.70 
Valuing Honesty 5.77 0.45 0.67 
 
Honesty 
Participants completed a self-report measure to rate how much they value honesty using 
the honesty subscale of the Values in Action Character Survey (Peterson & Seligman, 2004), a 
nine item measure of honesty (see Appendix D). Responses are on a scale of 1 (disagree 
strongly) to 7 (agree strongly) and descriptive statistics for this scale are provided in Table 2.  
After watching the lie videos, perceivers completed a truth or lie measure, in which they 
indicated whether they thought the targets were lying or telling the truth and rated their 
confidence in their judgments of the targets’ honesty and whether they trusted the target (see 
Appendix E).  
 
Procedure  
One of the two video orders for the personality and lie videos were randomly chosen for 
each session before the study. The questionnaires were completed via Qualtrics. Participants 
reviewed the consent form and after consenting they completed the personality and honesty self-
report, as well as demographics measures. They then viewed the videos of 10 individuals 
answering questions about their major life decisions, passions, and greatest accomplishments. 
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After each video, participants rated the personality of the individual in the video. After viewing 
all the personality videos and rating the personality of all the individuals in the videos, 
participants viewed the 14 low and high stakes truth or lie videos and after each video completed 
the truth or lie measure. After participants watched all the lie videos and completed the truth or 
lie measure for each target, they were debriefed, and the study ended. For those that completed 
the study in a Social Psychology course (n = 97) and a Psychology and Law course (n = 61), 
questionnaires were completed on paper instead of Qualtrics. Finally, those that completed the 
study in a Sensation and Perception undergraduate course (n = 30) also completed the 
questionnaires on paper and watched the lying videos first and rated whether they thought the 
targets were lying or telling the truth and then watched the personality videos and rated the 
personality of the targets.  
 
Data Analytic Procedure 
Using the Social Accuracy Model (Biesanz, 2010) allowed me to assess individual 
differences in perceptive distinctive and normative accuracy. I analyzed Equation 1 to assess 
overall impression accuracy across all the personality traits, except I focused on the perceiver 
random effects to assess the individual differences between perceivers instead of targets. For this 
study I was interested in how accurate perceivers were in judging personality. The equations for 
the level two characteristics were: 
β0ij =  β00 +  β01 +  u0𝑖 +  𝑢0𝑗 +  𝑢0(𝑖𝑗), 
β1ij =  β10 +  β11 + u1𝑖 +  𝑢1𝑗 + 𝑢1(𝑖𝑗) , and 
β2ij =  β20 +  β21 +  u2𝑖 +  𝑢2𝑗 +  𝑢2(𝑖𝑗), 
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where β0ij estimates the intercept for perceiver i for target j, β1ij estimates the distinctive 
accuracy of perceiver i for target j, and β2ij estimates the normative accuracy of perceiver i for 
target j. To test my hypotheses, I included the variables of interest as a moderator to the level two 
equations. For example, to assess the accuracy of lie judgments I used Equation 2: 
β0𝑖𝑗 =  β00 +  β01LyingAccuracy𝑖  + u0𝑖 +  𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢0(𝑖𝑗), 
β1𝑖𝑗 =  β10 +  β11LyingAccuracy𝑖 + u1𝑖 +  𝑢1𝑗 +  𝑢1(𝑖𝑗), and 
β2𝑖𝑗 =  β20 +  β21LyingAccuracy𝑖 +  u2𝑖 +  𝑢2𝑗 +  𝑢2(𝑖𝑗), 
where lying accuracy, the total number of correct truth and lie judgments, was added as a 
moderator of the distinctive and normative accuracy slopes to determine whether good 
distinctive and normative judges of personality are also more accurate in their judgments of 
lying. I followed the same procedure for all the moderator variables being assessed in my 
hypotheses. However, when assessing the effects of good judges of specific traits, I only 
included the items that assessed that trait and assessed the accuracy of those judgments. For 
example, when assessing the good judge of honesty-humility I only included the perceivers’ 
ratings of the honesty-humility items and then used equation 1 to assess distinctive and 
normative accuracy.  
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CHAPTER V 
THESIS STUDY RESULTS 
 
 
General Impression Accuracy 
Personality Impression Accuracy 
 First, I assessed the general accuracy of the perceivers’ personality impressions using 
Equation 1. Then I tested whether there were significant individual differences in the ability to 
accurately judge personality and the ability to be accurately judged using a chi square test. 
Overall, perceivers were distinctively accurate, meaning their impressions of the target were 
related to the target’s self-report. This indicates that perceivers had an accurate understanding of 
the unique traits of the personality video targets (Table 3). Perceivers were also normatively 
accurate, meaning they viewed targets, on average, as similar to the average person and 
positively (Table 3).   
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Table 3  Personality Impression Accuracy 
 
Parameter Estimates (SE) 
Fixed Effects  
Intercept 3.77 (0.05)*** 
Distinctive Accuracy 0.29 (0.04)*** 
Normative Accuracy 0.81 (0.07)*** 
Random Effects  
Perceiver  
    Intercept 0.27*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.09*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.35*** 
Target  
    Intercept 0.15*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.13*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.21*** 
Dyad  
    Intercept 0.05*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.14*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.28*** 
Residual SD 1.24 
Sample Sizes  
Perceivers 257 
Targets 10 
Dyads 2014 
Note. ***p < .001  
 
Moreover, there were significant individual differences between the accuracy of 
perceivers and how accurately targets were viewed. There were significant individual differences 
in how distinctively accurate perceivers were (Table 3, Random Effects), meaning that some 
perceivers were, on average, more accurate than others. This provides evidence of the good 
judge of personality, as good judges of personality are individuals who more accurately judge 
personality. There were significant individual differences in how normatively accurate perceivers 
were (Table 3, Random Effects), indicating that perceivers differed in how positively they 
viewed others. I created density plots to provide a visual representation of the variability of the 
normative and distinctive accuracy assessments. The density plot for perceiver distinctive 
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accuracy shows the variability between perceivers in their ability to judge others distinctively 
accurately (Figure 4). The density plot for perceiver normative accuracy shows the variability 
between perceivers in their ability to judge others normatively accurately (Figure 5). These 
density plots show variability in how accurately the perceivers were in their personality 
judgments, further supporting that there were individual differences between perceivers in how 
accurate their judgments were. While the variability is narrow, there are still individual 
differences in perceivers’ ability to distinctively accurately judge others.  
  
 
Figure 4  Density plot of the distinctive good judge 
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Figure 5  Density plot of the normative good judge 
 
Finally, there were also significant individual differences in how accurately targets were 
viewed, for both distinctive and normative accuracy (Table 3, Random Effects), indicating that 
targets differed in how accurately they were viewed. This provides evidence of the good target of 
personality, as good targets are individuals whose personality is judged more accurately. Finally, 
there were significant differences between dyads on distinctive and normative accuracy above 
and beyond those accounted for by the perceiver and target effects (Table 3, Random Effects).     
 
Lying Impression Accuracy 
 To assess overall lying accuracy, I first added up the total number of accurate lie 
judgments for each perceiver to create a total lying accuracy variable. The total number of 
accurate judgments ranged from 0 to 13 out of a possible 14 videos (M = 7.73, Mdn = 8, SD = 
1.89), with 55% of perceived lie judgments being accurate (Table 3). That is, 55% of the time, 
perceivers accurately judged whether targets were lying or telling the truth. Figure 6 shows the 
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frequency of total accurate truth and lie judgments, with a dashed line where accuracy equaled 7 
indicating chance levels of accuracy. The dashed line where accuracy equals 8 shows the median 
accuracy score. I ran a one-sample t test to assess whether lying accuracy was significantly 
different than chance levels of getting 50% correct (7 correct judgments) and results indicate that 
this level of accuracy is significantly higher than chance levels, t(256) = 6.24, p < .001. This 
indicates that, on average, participants were slightly above chance levels for detecting lying.  
 
 
Figure 6  Histogram of total lie accuracy 
 
Table 4 reports the number of times participants correctly rated targets as honest or lying, 
as well as the number of times participants incorrectly rated targets as honest or lying. These 
numbers are then broken down for low and high stakes lies as well as the four different groups. 
Table 4 also reports the percentages of correct and incorrect impressions of honesty and lying. 
These percentages were created by dividing the number of correct impressions (e.g. targets were  
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perceived as honest when they were honest or perceived as lying when they were lying) and 
incorrect impressions (e.g., targets were perceived as honest when they were lying or perceived 
as lying when they were honest) by the total number of impressions formed.  
When looking at the frequency of perceived honest and lie judgments for overall lying 
accuracy, low stakes lies, SONA participants, psychology and law participants, and sensation 
and perception participants, participants tended to be accurate more often in their judgments of 
honesty and inaccurate more often in their perceptions of lying (Table 4). This means that 
perceivers may have been more likely to rate someone as being honest when the target was 
honest and more likely to rate someone as honest even when they were lying. When judging high 
stakes lies, participants tended to be accurate more often in their judgments of lying and 
inaccurate more often in their judgments of honesty (Table 4, High Stakes Lying Accuracy). This 
means that perceivers may have been more likely to rate someone as lying when they were lying 
and more likely to rate someone as lying even when targets were honest when judging high 
stakes lies. For those that completed the study in the social psychology course, participants 
tended to be equally accurate in rating lies and honest statements and tended to be inaccurate 
more often in their perceptions of lying (Table 4, Social Psychology Lying Accuracy). This 
means that perceivers may have been equally accurate when rating honest and lie statements and 
more likely to rate targets as lying when they were honest. However, these percentages are 
difficult to interpret as there were more honest videos. This makes it important to conduct further 
analyses to determine lying accuracy. 
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Table 4  Lying Accuracy Frequency 
 
 Target Honest (%) Target Lying (%) 
Total Lying Accuracy   
Perceived Honest 1065 (29%) 598 (16%) 
Perceived Lying 1026 (28%) 967 (26%) 
By type of lie   
High Stakes Lying Accuracy   
Perceived Honest 589 (28%) 360 (17%) 
Perceived Lying 459 (22%) 684 (33%) 
Low Stakes Lying Accuracy   
Perceived Honest 476 (30%) 238 (15%) 
Perceived Lying 567 (36%) 283 (18%) 
By group   
SONA Lying Accuracy   
Perceived Honest 324 (31%) 175 (17%) 
Perceived Lying 268 (26%) 269 (26%) 
Psychology and Law Lying Accuracy   
Perceived Honest 228 (27%) 156 (18%) 
Perceived Lying 260 (31%) 208 (24%) 
Social Psychology Lying Accuracy   
Perceived Honest 388 (29%) 185 (14%) 
Perceived Lying 375 (28%) 386 (29%) 
Sensation and Perception Lying Accuracy   
Perceived Honest 125 (29%) 82 (19%) 
Perceived Lying 123 (28%) 104 (24%) 
Note. These percentages are out of the total number of impressions formed for each section of 
the table.  
  
Given that a subset of participants completed the lying assessment first, I assessed 
whether there were differences in lying accuracy between participants that completed the lying 
assessment first versus those that completed the lying assessment last to determine whether order 
effects influenced the results. Across the four groups (three different classes and SONA), the 
average accuracy scores ranged from 7.15 to 8.01, with participants that completed the study 
through SONA being the most accurate in detecting deception and participants that completed 
the study through a psychology and law course being the least accurate (Table 5). To determine 
whether these differences were significant, I ran a univariate analysis of variance using simple 
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contrast coding to compare the groups that completed the lying assessment last to the group that 
completed it first. There were significant group differences, F(3) = 3.71, p = 0.01, however those 
differences were between those from the psychology and law course versus the social 
psychology and SONA participants, not between the groups that completing the lying assessment 
first versus last (Table 5).  
 
Table 5  Lying Accuracy by Group 
 
Variable n Mean SD Contrast Estimate SE 
SONA 74 8.01 1.64 0.68 0.42 
Psychology and Law 61 7.15 1.76 -0.19 0.32 
Social Psychology 97 7.98 2.11 0.69 0.29 
Sensation and Perception  30 7.39 1.75   
Note. Sensation and Perception course served as a reference group  
 
Good Judges and Lying Accuracy 
Are Good Distinctive Judges More Accurate in Detecting Lies? 
 I first hypothesized that good distinctive judges, those that view targets in line with the 
target’s unique personality traits, would detect lies more accurately than a poor judge. To analyze 
my first hypothesis, I assessed the total lying accuracy as a moderator to Equation 1. This 
allowed me to examine whether lying accuracy moderated the relationship between perceiver 
ratings and the target’s personality. Results indicated that lying accuracy did not moderate the 
relationship between perceivers’ ratings of targets’ personality and the distinctive accuracy 
assessment (Table 6), meaning that distinctive good judges did not more accurately detect lies. I 
followed the same procedure to assess whether normative good judges were more accurate in 
detecting lies and found that lying accuracy did not moderate the relationship between 
perceivers’ ratings of targets’ personality and the normative accuracy assessment (Table 6), 
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meaning that normative good judges did not more accurately detect lies. These results show that 
individuals who were more accurate at judging lies were not more accurate in forming 
personality impressions.   
 
Table 6  Personality Accuracy Moderated by Perceptions of Lying 
 
Variable Estimate SE 
Lying accuracy   
Overall   
Distinctive  0.003 0.004 
Normative  -0.01 0.01 
High stakes only   
Distinctive  0.00 0.01 
Normative  -0.02 0.02 
Honesty Bias   
 Overall   
  Normative (total honest ratings) 0.02* 0.01 
 Normative (total incorrect honest ratings)  0.05** 0.02 
High Stakes only   
 Normative (total honest ratings) 0.05** 0.02 
 Normative (total incorrect honest ratings)  0.05** 0.02 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
 
 I also predicted that the ability of a good distinctive judge to detect deception would be 
stronger with high stakes lies. To assess this, I only included judgments for high stakes lies and 
added that as a moderator to Equation 1. However, high stakes lies did not moderate the 
relationship between perceivers’ ratings of personality and the distinctive accuracy assessment 
(Table 6). I followed the same procedure to assess whether individuals who were more accurate 
in lie detection tended to view others normatively and found that accuracy of rating high stakes  
lies did not moderate the relationship between perceivers’ ratings of personality and the 
normative accuracy assessment (Table 6). This means that individuals who were more accurate 
in judging high stakes lies were not more accurate in forming personality impressions.  
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Do Normative Good Judges Display an Honesty Bias? 
 I hypothesized that normative judges would tend to rate others as being honest, since they 
tend to view others positively. To assess whether normative judges displayed an honesty bias, I 
only included the times that perceivers rated targets as being honest and added that as a 
moderator to Equation 1. Those honest judgments consisted of correct and incorrect honest 
judgments. I used this procedure because previous studies that assessed honesty bias looked at 
the total number of honest judgments, both accurate and inaccurate (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). 
Results indicated that individuals who formed more honest judgments were more likely to view 
others normatively accurately and positively (Table 6). Next, I created a variable in which I only 
included the times that perceivers inaccurately rated targets as being honest.  
I followed this procedure because it better represents an honesty bias; if perceivers rate a 
target as honest when they were honest, that does not display bias but an accurate impression of 
honesty. I added the total number of incorrect honest judgments as a moderator to Equation 1 
and found that individuals who formed more incorrect honest judgments were more likely to 
view others normatively and positively (Table 6). These results replicate when examining only 
high stakes lies (Table 6). Together, these results support the idea that individuals who tend to 
view others as honest, also tend to view others as similar to the average person and positively. 
 
Are Good Judges of Specific Traits More Accurate in Detecting Lies? 
 I also hypothesized that good judges of the specific traits would more accurately detect 
lies. To determine who is able to accurately assess honesty-humility in others, I used SAM (see 
Equation 1), but only included the eight items that assessed honesty-humility. Then, paralleling  
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previous approaches, I included perceiver’s lie detection accuracy as a moderator in the equation. 
Individuals who were more accurate in detecting lies were not more distinctively or normatively 
accurate in rating the honesty-humility of others (Table 7).  
 Next, I assessed the influence of good judges of agreeableness by including only the 
impression items that rated the trait of agreeableness, then included lying accuracy as a 
moderator to Equation 1. Results indicated that being a good distinctive or normative judge of 
agreeableness were not more accurate at detecting deception (Table 7). 
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Table 7  Good Judge of Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness and Lying Accuracy 
 
Parameters Honesty-Humility 
Estimates (SE) 
Agreeableness 
Estimates (SE) 
Fixed Effects   
Intercept 4.05 (0.05)*** 3.70 (0.06)*** 
Distinctive Accuracy 0.17 (0.07)*** 0.26 (0.08)*** 
Normative Accuracy 0.71 (0.06)*** 0.91 (0.06)*** 
Lying Accuracy -0.0003 (0.004) -0.000004 (0.003) 
Distinctive*Lying Accuracy -0.0001 (0.003) -0.0001 (0.004) 
Normative*Lying Accuracy -0.00001 (0.002) -0.00001 (0.002) 
Random Effects   
Perceiver   
    Intercept 0.24*** 0.28*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.18*** 0.18*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.35*** 0.29*** 
Target   
    Intercept 0.16*** 0.17*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.21*** 0.25*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.18*** 0.16*** 
Dyad   
    Intercept 0.37*** 0.34*** 
    Distinctive Accuracy 0.51*** 0.61*** 
    Normative Accuracy 0.40*** 0.36*** 
Residual SD 0.82 0.76 
Note. ***p < .001 
 
Perceiver Traits and Lying Accuracy 
Are Open and Agreeable Judges More Accurate in Detecting Lies? 
 I also predicted that perceivers who were high in openness and agreeableness, 
respectively would be more accurate in detecting lies. To test this hypothesis, I created a 
composite score for the personality traits of openness and agreeableness for each perceiver. I ran 
a linear regression, first with the openness composite as the independent variable and lying  
accuracy as the dependent variable, then with the agreeableness composite as the independent 
variable. However, being high in openness and agreeableness did not relate to higher accuracy in 
lie detection (Table 8).  
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Table 8  Personality Trait Predictors of Lying Accuracy 
 
Variable B SE t 
Openness    
Constant 7.17*** 0.75 9.57 
Openness 0.10 0.14 0.74 
Agreeableness    
Constant 8.40*** 0.87 9.67 
Agreeableness -0.12 0.15 -0.79 
Value Honesty    
Constant 7.45*** 1.54 4.82 
Value Honesty 0.05 0.27 0.19 
Note. ***p < .01    
 
Are Those That Value Honesty More Accurate in Detecting Lies? 
 I hypothesized that those that value honesty would more accurately detect lies, as honesty 
is more important to them in their daily life. To assess this, I created a composite score for each 
perceiver on valuing honesty and inputted that as the independent variable in a linear regression,  
with lying accuracy as the dependent variable. Results indicated that valuing honesty did not 
predict lying accuracy (Table 8). However, given the low reliability estimate in my sample this is 
underestimating the true effect. 
 
Are Those Who Are Confident More or Less Accurate in Detecting Lies? 
 Next, I hypothesized that confidence in lie judgments would be associated with the 
accuracy of lie judgments. To assess this, I related perceivers’ lying accuracy to their confidence 
in their judgments of honesty or lying. Overall, those that were more accurate in judging lies 
were not significantly more confident in their ratings (Table 9).  
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Table 9  Relating Lying Accuracy to Confidence and Trust for Good Judges  
 
Predictors Confidence B (SE) Trust B (SE) 
Lying Accuracy 0.16 (0.10) 0.34 (0.43) 
Distinctive Good Judge    
Moderation   
Distinctive Good Judge x Lying 
Accuracy 
0.79 (0.47) 0.68 (0.45) 
Dropping the moderation   
Distinctive Good Judge 2.58 (0.65)*** 1.09 (0.71) 
Normative Good Judge   
Moderation   
Normative Good Judge x Lying 
Accuracy 
0.18 (0.11) 0.14 (0.10) 
Dropping the moderation   
Normative Good Judge only 0.39 (0.15)*** 0.35 (0.16)*** 
Note. ***p < .01   
 
I also predicted that good judges that were confident in their lie judgments would be 
more accurate because they would not focus on irrelevant cues. To assess this, I first related 
perceivers’ lying accuracy to their confidence in their judgments of honesty or lying and 
included the distinctive good judge assessment as a moderator in the equation. Distinctive good 
judges were more confident in their judgments, but that confidence was not related to higher 
levels of lie detection accuracy (Table 9). This means that the relationship between lying  
accuracy and confidence in truth and lie judgments is not stronger for distinctive good judges. 
Due to the interactions between the distinctive good judge assessment and lying accuracy being 
non-significant, I dropped the interaction to trim the model for parsimony (Table 9). 
Next, I added the assessment of the normative good judge as a moderator to the equation 
of accuracy and confidence. The normative good judge assessment did not moderate the 
relationship between lying accuracy and confidence (Table 9), meaning that the relationship  
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between lying accuracy and confidence was not stronger for normative good judges. I then 
dropped the non-significant interaction for parsimony and found that normative good judges 
were, on average, more confident (Table 9).  
 
Perception of Target and Lying Accuracy 
Are Those Who Are Perceived as Trustworthy Viewed as Honest? 
 I next hypothesized that when perceivers viewed a target as credible or trustworthy they 
would be more likely to rate that target as being honest. To test this, I related perceivers’ lying 
accuracy to their ratings of trusting the targets. Perceivers who accurately judged true statements 
and lies did not trust the target more (Table 9). I then tested whether this effect was stronger for 
distinctive good judges by including the assessment of the distinctive good judge as a moderator 
to the lie accuracy and trusting the target equation. Being a distinctive good judge did not 
moderate the relationship between lying accuracy and trusting the target (Table 9), meaning that  
the relationship between lying accuracy and trusting the target was not stronger for a good 
distinctive judge. I then dropped the nonsignificant interaction for parsimony and found that 
distinctive good judges, on average, did not trust the targets more (Table 9). 
 Next, I added the assessment of the normative good judge as a moderator to the lying 
accuracy and trusting the target equation. The normative good judge assessment did not 
moderate the relationship between lying accuracy and trusting the target (Table 9), meaning that 
this relationship was not stronger for normative good judges. I dropped the nonsignificant 
interaction for parsimony and found that normative good judges, on average, tended to trust 
targets more (Table 9).  
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Previous research has indicated that people are generally accurate in judging the 
personality of others (Biesanz, 2010; Biesanz & Human, 2010; Funder, 1995), but there have 
been mixed results about the existence of the good judge (Davis & Kraus, 1997) and the 
importance of the good judge in the accuracy of personality impressions (Haselton & Funder, 
2006). However, recent studies have highlighted the importance of the good target (Human & 
Biesanz, 2013) and have used new methodological techniques to examine the importance of the 
good target in examining the good judge (Rogers & Biesanz, in press), which I replicated in my 
study. Using these techniques, my results provide further evidence for the existence and 
importance of the good judge of personality. As expected, perceivers did vary in their ability to 
accurately judge the personality of targets. Using good targets in my main study creates more 
variability in the estimates of the good judge, which increases the ability to find effects for the 
good judge. The goal of this project was to assess what other skills are related to accurately 
judging personality, specifically the ability to accurately judge lies.  
Past research in detecting deception has found that, on average, people are inaccurate in 
their judgments of lying, with lie accuracy often being no better than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 
2008; DePaulo et al., 1997). There are some predictors of being able to accurately judge lying, 
such as focusing on relevant cues of deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij et al., 2010), being 
trained in relevant cues of deception (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et al., 2010), and the 
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ability to identify micro-expressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997), however they are often unreliable 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij & Semin, 1996). The goal of this project was to assess whether being 
a good judge of personality was related to accurately judging lies. My results indicated that good 
distinctive and normative judges did not more accurately detect lies, however the accuracy of lie 
judgments was significantly greater than chance. These accuracy levels are consistent with those 
found in the original study using these stimuli, with perceivers rating lies at greater than chance 
levels (Hatz, 2007) and more accurate than what has been found in previous research in lie 
detection (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). It is possible that these video stimuli made relevant 
deception cues available to perceivers, allowing them to form more accurate judgments of lying. 
The lying scenario used in (Hatz, 2007) involved real transgressions, meaning that the targets 
who are lying about cheating did cheat. When compared to scenarios that instruct participants to 
lie when no cheating occurred, real transgression scenarios produced more deceptive cues (Hatz, 
2007). This could indicate that using real transgression lying scenarios could lead to more 
accurate judgments of lying or honesty. Being a good judge, the personality traits of openness 
and agreeableness, and perceptions of targets did not appear to be related to higher levels of 
accuracy, so more research needs to be done to assess why these perceivers formed accurate 
impressions of lying and honesty on average. 
These findings provide insight into personality and deception research, further informing 
both fields about the skills associated with forming accurate impressions. The results of this 
study also supported the conclusion of Schlegel et al. (2017), that the ability to accurately judge 
personality is not related to accurately judging lies, even when directly assessing personality and 
lying impressions instead of using a meta-analytic technique. This meta-analysis also excluded 
studies that scored personality accuracy based on target criteria, such as self and informant 
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reports, instead they focused on standardized assessments. Therefore, my results provide 
evidence that personality and lying impressions are likely not related when assessing personality 
accuracy using non-standardized assessments, specifically comparing self- and informant- 
reports to perceivers’ impressions.  
 
Interpretation of Results 
 Even though my hypotheses were not supported, these null results provide information 
about the good judge of personality and the skills required to detect deception. These results 
indicate that the skills associated with accurately judging personality are not related to the skills 
required to detect lies.  
 
Good Judge of Personality 
 The first important application of these results is that it further informs the field about the 
skills of the good judge of personality. First, this study provided further evidence of the existence 
of the good judge because perceivers varied in their ability to accurately judge personality. 
Earlier research found no effect of the good judge (Allik et al., 2016) or concluded that the good 
judge was not of significant consequence to accurately forming impressions (Haselton & Funder, 
2006). However, recent research has highlighted the importance of the target when forming 
impressions (Human & Biesanz, 2013; Human et al., 2012). Indeed, the effect of the good judge 
is more pronounced when good judges rated good targets (Rogers & Biesanz, in press). I used 
this information to design my methodology for my main study because this study indicated that 
using good targets increases the variance of good judges, making it easier to differentiate 
between good judges. That is, if the targets provide little information about their personality, it is 
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harder to distinguish between good judges, but good targets who provide a lot of information 
make it easier to distinguish between good judges of personality. 
While good judges are skilled at forming accurate personality impressions, there is 
limited research assessing their skills at forming other impressions such as lying. This study 
further informs research on the good judge by showing that they are not skilled at forming 
impressions of lying. One potential reason for this is that the ability to detect and utilize social 
cues does not translate to detecting and utilizing lying cues. Forming personality impressions is 
also a broader skill, as perceivers are judging multiple traits that individuals can be low or high 
in. On the other hand, accurately detecting lies is a specific impression of either truth or lie.  
 
Accurately Detecting Deception 
 The next important application of these results is that they further inform research on the 
skills required to detect deception. There are few reliable individual differences that contribute to 
accurately judging lies, and the results of this study indicate that being a good judge is not an 
individual difference in the ability to accurately judge lies. This is likely because detecting social 
cues may require different skills than those required to detect lying cues. One of the most reliable 
individual differences in the ability to detect lies is training (Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Vrij et 
al., 2010), so it is possible that some training concerning which cues to focus on is required for 
accuracy to be significantly higher than chance levels. Since my participants were not trained in 
what cues indicate lying, this could have made detecting lies too difficult of a task.  
Another possible influence is that detecting emotional cues, such as microexpressions in 
high stakes lies, is a crucial skill in detecting deception (Frank & Ekman, 1997). Research has 
shown that accurately judging personality is related to accurately judging affect (Hall et al., 
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2016), however research has not assessed whether good judges are better at detecting emotional 
cues, such as microexpressions. It is possible that good judges are not skilled in detecting 
microexpressions, which is one of the few reliable cues to deception (Frank & Ekman, 1997; 
Yan et al., 2014). If good judges are not skilled in detecting microexpressions, this could 
decrease their ability to judge high stakes lies, so it is important to examine the individual 
differences in the good judge’s ability to detect microexpressions.  
 
Limitations 
 There are some limitations in this study that may have influenced the results. First, using 
video targets does provide a different estimate of the ability of the good judge to form accurate 
impressions than in person interactions. Some research has indicated that good judges are able to 
make targets comfortable in their interactions resulting in the targets eliciting more cues to their 
personality (Letzring, 2008). Accurate judgments are formed using video targets (Rogers & 
Biesanz, in press) and were formed in the current study, showing that the ability of the good 
judge to accurately judge personality relates more to their ability to detect and utilize cues 
instead of their ability to elicit relevant cues from the target. While the good judge’s ability is not 
limited to eliciting more cues during interactions, using video targets does alter the estimates of 
the good judge. As the current study did not assess the effect of the good judge using in person 
interactions, we cannot conclusively state that the good judge of personality is not more accurate 
in judging lies.  
The sample in the current study also included a large number of participants that 
completed the study in psychology courses. Due to the large size of the groups that they 
participated in, it is possible that participants were distracted and influenced by the reactions of 
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those around them. The total number of accurate truth and lie judgments of the participants that 
completed the study through SONA was significantly higher than the lying accuracy of those that 
completed the study in the psychology and law course, indicating that there were lower levels of 
lie detection accuracy for one larger group of participants. This was only found for one larger 
group, so this is likely not a large limitation in the main study.  
This group effect was not replicated in the other large group of participants from the 
social psychology course, they had higher levels of accuracy than those that completed the study 
in the psychology and law course. There were also some issues with the sound system in the 
social psychology course, which one would think would lead to lower levels of lie accuracy. 
Their higher levels of lie accuracy could indicate that those participants were more able to detect 
lies than others in the sample. This could be due to exposure to research in detecting deception 
covered in their social psychology course or because they could have relied more on nonverbal  
cues, possibly indicating that nonverbal cues are more reliable indicators of lying. General ability 
and reliance on nonverbal cues could have increased this group’s lie accuracy, which would 
confound my results.  
Finally, the manipulation used in the lie videos may have not been high stakes enough to 
create the emotional cues that lead to more accurate impressions of high stakes versus low stakes 
lies. High stakes lies are rated more accurately than low stakes lies due to the presence of 
microexpressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997), so if the manipulation did not result in expressing 
microexpressions the accuracy of judging lies would decrease.  
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Future Directions 
To build upon this research, future research could use a round robin design to estimate 
the individual differences in the accuracy of personality impressions. My study assessed the 
accuracy of the good judge using video targets, which provides a different estimate of the good 
judge than in person interactions. This is due to the good judge’s ability to make targets 
comfortable in their interactions resulting in the targets eliciting more cues to their personality 
(Letzring, 2008). Using a round robin design would allow researchers to examine the good 
judge’s ability to detect lies using good judge assessments obtained from in person interactions.     
It would also be interesting to have participants complete a task that assesses their ability 
to detect microexpressions (Frank & Ekman, 1997). This would allow us to assess the individual 
differences in the accuracy of judging microexpressions and determine whether being a good 
judge relates to that ability. Finally, it may be possible to explore a lens model (Gosling, Ko, 
Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002; Hartwig & Bond, 2011) in which the accuracy of individuals’ 
impressions are related to the relevant cues provided. Lens models state that environmental cues 
provide a lens through which perceivers can form impressions about a construct (Gosling et al., 
2002), such as personality or lying. If a cue relates to a perceiver’s judgment of the construct and 
the target’s actual level of that construct, then the perceiver will form an accurate impression 
(Gosling et al., 2002), indicating that the cue was relevant. For example, a lens model of lie 
accuracy would relate the given deception cues to a perceiver’s judgment of a target’s honesty or 
dishonesty and the target’s actual honesty or dishonesty. This model and behavioral coding could 
highlight relevant cues of deception as well as the differences in relevant verbal and nonverbal 
deception cues. This could demonstrate whether relying on verbal or nonverbal cues lead to more 
accurate judgments of deception. 
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Conclusion 
Even though my hypotheses were not supported these results provide research with a 
better understanding of good judges of personality and the individual differences that are not 
related to lie detection accuracy. This research provides evidence that the good judge exists and 
more accurately judges personality, indicating that without assessing the good target studies are 
missing a crucial component in determining the accuracy of forming impressions and the effect 
of the good judge. However, good judges do not more accurately detect lies, indicating that their 
skills in observing social cues are not related to the ability to observe lying cues. These results 
indicate the importance of understanding the processes involved in forming different types of 
impressions and start to determine which types of impressions are related to one another. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
PERSONALITY SELF-REPORT 
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Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.  For example, do you agree 
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please write a number next to each 
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
a little 
Neutral Agree a 
little 
Agree 
 
Agree 
strongly 
 
I See Myself as Someone Who . . . 
1. Is bashful 
2. Is bold 
3. Is careless 
4. Is cold 
5. Is complex 
6. Is cooperative 
7. Is creative 
8. Is deep 
9. Is disorganized 
10. Is efficient 
11. Is energetic 
12. Is envious 
13. Is extraverted 
14. Is fretful 
15. Is harsh 
16. Is imaginative 
17. Is inefficient 
18. Is intellectual 
19. Is jealous 
20. Is kind 
21. Is moody 
22. Is organized 
23. Is philosophical 
24. Is practical 
25. Is quiet 
26. Is relaxed 
27. Is rude 
28. Is shy 
29. Is sloppy 
30. Is sympathetic 
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31. Is systematic 
32. Is talkative 
33. Is temperamental  
34. Is touchy 
35. Is uncreative 
36. In unenvious 
37. Is unintellectual 
38. Is unsympathetic 
39. Is warn 
40. Is withdrawn 
41. Is authentic 
42. Is phony 
43. Is superficial 
44. Is humble  
45. Is entitled  
46. Is honest 
47. Is down to earth 
48. Is materialistic 
49. Is bright 
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APPENDIX B 
 
PERSONALITY IMPRESSIONS 
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Please write the number that indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with that 
statement: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
a little 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree a 
little 
Agree 
 
Agree 
strongly 
 
I see this person as someone who… 
1. Is bashful 
2. Is bold 
3. Is careless 
4. Is cold 
5. Is complex 
6. Is cooperative 
7. Is creative 
8. Is deep 
9. Is disorganized 
10. Is efficient 
11. Is energetic 
12. Is envious 
13. Is extraverted 
14. Is fretful 
15. Is harsh 
16. Is imaginative 
17. Is inefficient 
18. Is intellectual 
19. Is jealous 
20. Is kind 
21. Is moody 
22. Is organized 
23. Is philosophical 
24. Is practical 
25. Is quiet 
26. Is relaxed 
27. Is rude 
28. Is shy 
29. Is sloppy 
30. Is sympathetic 
31. Is systematic 
32. Is talkative 
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33. Is temperamental  
34. Is touchy 
35. Is uncreative 
36. In unenvious 
37. Is unintellectual 
38. Is unsympathetic 
39. Is warn 
40. Is withdrawn 
41. Is authentic 
42. Is phony 
43. Is superficial 
44. Is humble  
45. Is entitled  
46. Is honest 
47. Is down to earth 
48. Is materialistic 
49. Is bright 
50. Is mature 
51. Is reasonable 
52. Is hypocritical 
53. Is inconsiderate 
54. Has high status 
55. Is a leader 
56. Is respected and admired by others 
57. Is very likable 
58. Is physically attractive 
59. Is engaging and interesting 
60. Is from the same cultural or ethnic group as me 
61. Has a similar accent or way of speaking as me 
62. Is aggressive and unrestrained 
63. Is bashful and unassuming 
64. Is opportunistic and crafty 
65. Is sarcastic and demanding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Not At 
All 
 
 
 Neutral   A Great 
Deal 
 
66. How much do you like this person overall? 
67. How much do you trust this person? 
68. How well do you think your impression would agree with someone who knows this 
person very well? 
69. How well do you think this person’s impression of you would agree with how you and 
your close friends view your personality? 
70. What are the individual’s political beliefs? Use scale below.  
71. Please circle the picture or letter below which best depicts you in relation to the person in 
the video. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
79.  Have you met this person before?    Yes  No 
80.  If yes, how do you know him/her? ______________________________  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conservative   Neutral   Liberal 
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APPENDIX C 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
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1. What is your age (in years)? _______________ 
2. What is your gender? 
A. Male 
B. Female 
C. Other 
D. Prefer not to answer 
3. What is your ethnicity?_______________________ 
4. What is your major?__________________ 
5. What is your class rank?  
A. Freshman 
B. Sophomore 
C. Junior 
D. Senior 
E. Other  
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APPENDIX D 
 
VALUING HONESTY SELF-REPORT 
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Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you.  For example, do you agree 
that you are someone who likes to spend time with others?  Please write a number next to each 
statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
a little 
Neutral Agree a 
little 
Agree 
 
Agree 
strongly 
 
I… 
1. Am trusted to keep secrets.  
2. Keep my promises. 
3. Believe that honesty is the basis for trust.  
4. Can be trusted to keep my promises. 
5. Am true to my own values. 
6. Lie to get myself out of trouble. 
7. Am hard to understand. 
8. Feel like an imposter. 
9. Like to exaggerate my troubles. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
TRUTH OR LIE IMPRESSIONS 
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Please indicate whether this person was telling the truth or lying: 
1 2 
 
Truth 
 
Lie 
 
Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with that statement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
 
Disagree 
 
 
Disagree 
a little 
Neutral Agree a 
little 
Agree 
 
Agree 
strongly 
 
1. I am confident in my impression of this person’s honesty. 
2. I trust this person. 
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